Eurasian partnership: A new balance of power?

_ Li Xin, Director of the Institute for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; Professor and doctoral mentor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics; Hu Yuanhong; Doctoral student at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Shanghai, 3 January 2018.

In June 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putn signed a joint statement with Chinese President Xi Jinping, declaring the goal of “a comprehensive partnership between Europe and Asia on the basis of openness, transparency and consideration of each other’s interests, including the possibility of joining together the Eurasian Economic Union, the SCO, and ASEAN”.

A deepening of regional integration has since been well underway. This paper analyses the strategic intentions behind Russia’s ‘Greater Eurasia’ vision and its relationship with China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, thus examining the geo-strategic positioning, connotations, and roadmap-building of the comprehensive Eurasian partnership.

1. The concept of Eurasia in Russian literature

Geographically, ‘Eurasia’ is simply the land spread over the Eurasian tectonic plate, including both Europe and Asia. As a political concept, however, the term originated with the ‘White Settlers’ of the early 1920s.[1]

Since then, influential authors like Trusecki, Berjiev, Struve, Milyukov, and Iliin have all contributed to Europe and Asia being seen as a single entity with Russia at its core.[2] Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, sees Eurasia as an alternative name for the territory covered by the former Soviet Union.[3] Marlene Laruelle looks at Eurasia from the perspective of geopolitics, describing it as a historical space made up of Russia and its “peripheral world”.[4]

Countless organisations across North America, Europe, and Asia have begun to use the term Eurasia as a way of distancing themselves from the legacy of the Soviet Union. This way of conceptualising Eurasia, as simply the territory controlled by the Russian and Soviet empires, is known as ‘Small Eurasia’.

Trenin describes the integration progress promoted by Russia in the former Soviet region in terms of ‘Small Eurasia’. He notes, “in 2014-2015, the integration progress of Small Eurasia was hampered due to Russian geopolitical losses, without totally halting its progress”[5] and comments that the Small Eurasia expressed by the Eurasian Economic Union is simply a cash-strapped economic pact”. [6]

In 1904, Halford Mackinder described Middle Asia, Afghanistan, and Southern Siberia as Eurasia’s “heartland”, asserting that whoever controls this heartland will ultimately control the whole world”.[7] Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives, first published in 1997, agrees with Mackinder: “The dominant power in Eurasia will control the most economically developed regions of the world”.[8]

It is this kind of strategic thinking that has led Russia to turn its attention to nations at its periphery and to go beyond the limits of Small Eurasia in recent years. After Russian attempts to integrate into Europe were blocked, the Valdai Club proposed the concept of ‘Middle Eurasia’.

In April 2015, Timofei Boldachev, head of the Eurasia Project at the Valdai Club, wrote in Russian Izvestia newspaper that, “in 2015, it can be said that the moment of ‘Middle Eurasia’ has arrived, a unique intersection of the international political and economic situations”.[9]Boldachev goes on, “in core Eurasia – Siberian Russia, Kazakhstan, Middle Asia, and Western China – an autonomous growth pole will form and likely become one of the most important geopolitical areas in the first half of the 21st Century. … It will become a common area of Russian and Chinese strategic foreign policy”.[10]

As Russia refined its objectives, the Valdai Club quickly shifted from the concept of ‘Middle Eurasia’ to ‘Greater Eurasia’. In June 2015, Valdai’s Toward the great ocean 3: Creating central Eurasia report stated, “establishing a cooperation zone in Eurasia can lead to a community of cooperation for all of Eurasia. … Greater Eurasia should be a model of the positive-sum game for all people, and of cooperation over confrontation”.[11] Sergey Karaganov has detailed this new economic and political space, referring to it as the “Great Eurasian Community”.[12]

Complementary claims about Greater Eurasia include the idea that it will promote more constructive dialogue – based on the idea that Eurasia contains a diversity of civilisations and religions, represented by multiple intergovernmental organisations[13] – with Middle Eastern and South Asian partners,[14] and that it will enable a new economic space inclusive of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union, and ASEAN. This will see alignment between the Silk Road Economic Zone and the Eurasian Economic Union.

2. The Greater Eurasia initiative

Vladimir Putin first promoted the Greater Eurasia strategy in September 2013 at the Valdai Club’s AGM. But the initiative owes just as much to Chinese President Xi Jinping.

In September and October 2013, Xi established respective agreements with Kazakhstan and Indonesia, based on The Silk Road Economic Zone and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The initiative, authorised by the State Council, plans six economic corridors[15]complemented by three blue economic corridors.[16]

The document notes, “historically, the overland Silk Road and the maritime Silk Road have been major channels for China’s economic and cultural communication with Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Western Asia, East Africa, and Europe. The ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative is the inheritance of the ancient Silk Road”. Because the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative is intended to form a broad consensus across Europe, Asia, and Africa, the necessity of connecting the Silk Road Economic Zone with the Eurasian Economic Union has also been noted.[17]

In May 2015, a joint statement of cooperation on the construction of Silk Road projects and the Eurasian Economic Union was signed by the Chinese and Russian heads of state. Xi Jinping stated its goal to promote the further “linking of the two countries’ development strategies, the development of ‘One Belt One Road’ and the Eurasian Economic Union, and the development of deeper economic relations in Eurasia”. Vladimir Putin praised the plan for “opening up joint economic space across the Eurasian Continent”.

Over the next six months, Putin developed the idea further. In December 2015, his presidential message recommended “consultation with the Eurasian Economic Union, ASEAN, SCO and countries joining the SCO for the establishment of possible economic partnership”. A series of statements over the course of 2016, culminating in the Sochi Declaration, promoted the idea of a free trade agreement between ASEAN, the SCO, and the Eurasian Economic Union.

After Putin’s June 2016 clarification of his intention to establish a great Eurasian partnership “establishing closer relations with China, India, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) partners”, the Chinese government became one of the first countries to accept this initiative. Another joint statement from the two heads of state stated that “China and Russia advocate the establishment of a comprehensive Eurasian partnership on the basis of openness, transparency and consideration of each other’s interests, including the cooperative potential of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN member states”.[18]

The idea received further support within the region in 2015 and 2016. Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev had been the first to promote the idea of a Eurasian Union in 1994 and returned to the idea in 2015. The idea of Greater Eurasia proposed by Nazarbayev would including liberalisation of trade relations among member countries, joint development of transport corridors, diversification of energy transport routes, expansion of investment cooperation, and other economic cooperation issues. Kazakhstan’s Greater Eurasia concept is designed to connect the Pacific with Europe via land transport routes in order for logistics and transport infrastructure to be the driving force of Kazakhstan’s long-term economic development.

In June 2016, Nazarbayev and Putin discussed Greater Eurasia and promoted the Greater Eurasian Partnership initiative at the subsequent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

3. Russian strategy: From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia

Russian strategic planning had once looked to the idea of Greater Europe. In September 2015, Igor Ivanov, Russia’s former foreign minister and a one-time champion of the idea, admitted the plan had failed.[19]

3.1. The Russian dream of Greater Europe

Geographically, Greater Europe includes the whole of Europe, Russia, Kazakhstan, and the South Caucasus of the former Soviet Union. For Ivanov however, Greater Europe is not geographical but political, signifying a Russian plan for integration with Europe and extension from west to east. From a Western European perspective, however, Russia has always been difficult to accept.

Charles De Gaulle first invoked the concept of Greater Europe during his visit to Germany in September 1962, claiming the “obsolete Eastern ideology” was to be eliminated from the Atlantic to the Urals. He privately explained to the Soviet Ambassador to France that “it’s time for us to build Europe with the Soviet Union”. In reality, the Greater Europe era only began in the late1980s.

Eventually, Soviet leaders acquiesced to the merger of East and West Germany, as well as to the merger of Eastern Europe and Western Europe in order to construct a common space ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. The cost of this move was the dismembering of the Soviet Union and the Russian elite normalising their new status in Europe through ‘shock therapy’.

The cooperation document signed by Russia, the EU, and NATO in 1990, alongside Russian accession to the Council of Europe, marked the initiation of the Greater Europe plan. During Putin’s first presidency, Russia and the EU reached agreement on economic, security, humanitarian, and educational aspects of the European common space and formulated a roadmap for ‘Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok’.

3.2. The truth about Western Greater Europe

The dream of a common space for partnership between the EU and Russia was a false dawn. In The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Brzezinski explains that the existence of any group challenging US dominance will be prohibited, including anything bearing traces of Russia’s imperial heritage.

For this reason, the US prevented the growth of Greater Europe and promoted the expansion of NATO – under US guardianship – into post-Soviet space. If Russian society was to be modernised, it would have to be on the basis of a market economy with limited scope for state intervention.[20] Hence, under cover of the illusion of Greater Europe, the EU and NATO headed towards the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence step by step, reaching out to Eastern Bloc satellite countries and newly independent countries like Estonia.

Through the GUAM group,[21] efforts were made to break other former Soviet states free of their dependence on Russia, in coordination with the European Neighbourhood program first unveiled in 2003. In order to support pro-Western regimes, Western powers supported a series of revolutionary uprisings with varying degrees of success, including the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Denim Revolution in Belarus.

In response, Russia began to strengthen the Eurasian integration progress through a customs union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 2010 and the set up the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014-2015. The commitment to build the Eurasian Union together was arguably a key factor in the lead-up to the conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine. In 2014, the ruptures between Russia and the West resulted in severe sanctions against Russia and the ghost of the Cold War was revived.[22]

3.3. Russia’s enforced turn towards Greater Eurasia

Dmitri Trenin has argued that in the aftermath of the failed attempt to turn Russia into part of the Western world, Russian efforts to establish a centre of Eurasian power on former Soviet territory would remain unsuccessful without the participation of Ukraine.

In Trenin’s view, Russia’s Eurasia vision originated in the geopolitical desire to create a Moscow-led centre of power, rather than in economic interests. Unfortunately, Eurasian integration did not have the prerequisite political alliances among CIS countries, which do not need a centre of power in Russia.[23] Trenin notes this as the source of urgency behind Russia’s Greater Europe program being replaced by a Greater Eurasia program.[24]

Western sanctions had a major effect on the Russian economy, causing stagnation in 2014 and recession in 2015. A simultaneous drop in international oil prices dealt Russia another severe blow. These two developments affected other Eurasian Economic Union countries, whose economic condition is highly dependent on Russia.

Historically, Asia has assumed secondary importance in Russian strategy, which has long looked to West rather than East. But as a result of the aggressive squeeze of Western sanctions, Russian foreign policy had to finally turn East.

This change was already notable in 2012 at the start of Putin’s third presidency, when he declared the development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East a national strategic priority, using the APEC summit in Vladivostok to establish a Far East development department and a Far East development company. These moves led to the establishment of the Free port of Vladivostok; the annual Eastern Economic Forum; and efforts to attract foreign investment.

Russia’s aim was to create a new area of economic growth at the same time as responding geopolitically to the United States, a response hastened by the Ukraine crisis.

The risk, according to Trenin, is that Russia’s Asia policy runs aground on an excessive dependence China and other bilateral relationships. Moscow’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific region should be to build a more extensive Greater Eurasia strategy as part of a global vision.[25]

In any case, Russian foreign policy has entered into the Eurasian era, the vision of which Timofei Boldachev has referred to as transforming Eurasia into “a common development region”[26] and Sergey Karaganov has called the “Great Eurasian Community”.[27]

Through the promise of organisational coordination with the SCO, supplemented by the AIIB, and the rapid development of logistics and transport networks,[28] the Astana Club said the May 2015 Russia-China joint statement ushered “Greater Eurasia from discussion into practice”.[29]

3.4. The Greater Eurasia roadmap

The primary institutional basis for Greater Eurasia is seen as the SCO. The Valdai Club refers to it as a “core mechanism”,[30] Dmitri Efremenko calls it an “incubator”,[31]Trenin sees it as key for policy communication,[32] and Karaganov argues the Eurasian community will grow amidst an expanding SCO.[33]

Greater Eurasia – as promoted by influential thinkers like Karaganov – should be based on traditional international legal principles like respect for territorial integrity and political pluralism, as well as economic liberalisation principles of win-win economic cooperation, and the development of a cooperative security system throughout the Eurasian continent. Cultural diversity and dialogue should be preserved alongside the protection of human rights.[34]

As far as Russia is concerned, the Greater Eurasia strategy also has a strategic component, reinforcing Russia’s geopolitical and geo-economic role at the core of the continent, serving as a transportation and economic hub and a safety provider for the whole Eurasian space. The relationship with China is seen mutually beneficial.[35]

3.5. Russia and China

Geopolitically, Russia’s Greater Eurasia strategy reflects the necessity of moving eastward to establish a non-Western geopolitical group with Russia and China at its core.

Dimitri Efremenko says that although the Russia-China relationship does not constitute a military or political alliance, as a ‘strategic partnership’ it is very important to Russia’s hopesfor transformation of the US-centric international order.[36] Sergey Karaganov sees the 21st Century global order being balanced between two major geopolitical groups: a TPP and TTIP group led by the US; and a Greater Eurasian Community led by Russia and China,[37]expectations shared by Dimitri Trenin.[38]

Importantly, although Russia wants to establish a new world order with China through a Greater Eurasian Community, Russia does not trust China.

Numerous Russian policy experts argue that amidst the deepening integration of post-Soviet space into Great Eurasia,[39] Russia should provide a friendly and constructive balance for China so that China does not become too strong.[40][41] The Valdai Club has said more pointedly that the link between the One Belt One Road initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union should prevent Eurasian Economic Union member states from carrying out contradictory bilateral dialogue and cooperation with China.[42]

The Astana Club has said that although geopolitics plays an important role, alliances in Eurasia have been proceeding less for geopolitical reasons than geo-economic ones.[43] As China increasingly becomes the economic locomotive of the entire region, cooperation in the form of regional free trade agreements and their attendant banking and currency infrastructure becomes somewhat obligatory.[44][45][46]

4. Making a success of the comprehensive Eurasian partnership

In geo-economic terms, Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s One Belt One Road are the same thing.

Vladimir Putin has suggested the Greater Eurasia program should be open to Europe and has made it clear he thinks Europe will eventually participate. According to Putin, Greater Eurasian partnerships “can be started from sectoral cooperation and investment controls, as well as non-tariff measures for technological standards, inspection standards, customs procedures, the liberalisation of intellectual property protection and the standardisation of rules, gradually reducing and removing tariff restrictions in the future”. Thus far, Russia has signed a free trade agreement with Vietnam, launched free-trade area negotiations with India, and planned to study the possibility of free trade with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.

Similar goals are seen in the One Belt One Road initiative. The Chinese initiative targets connections between China and Europe, and treats cooperation over trade and investment as its key pillars.

Accelerating free trade is an important part of China’s current stage of development. A recent State Council document says it is important to encourage “expansion of a free trade area to improve the level of openness and quality, participate in international rule-making, expand the new space of the open economy, and form a new pattern of comprehensive opening up”. At present, China has signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland, and eleven more free trade agreements are currently being negotiated.

I believe the comprehensive Eurasian partnership should focus on regional economic integration rather than geopolitical positioning.

Issues still to be resolved include commodity trade, services trade, investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition policy, dispute settlement mechanisms and other negotiating elements that need to be added to the situation.

The comprehensive Eurasian partnership will be the fourth attempt at a superregional economic entity, following APEC, TPP, and TTIP. At present, TPP has been shelved by the United States, while TTIP has also been boycotted by European countries. If the comprehensive Eurasian partnership is able to make a breakthrough, it will be of huge geopolitical significance for emerging Eurasian economies.

The diversity and complexity of security issues and cultural traditions across Eurasia means the comprehensive Eurasian partnership needs flexibility to achieve unity. A number of issues need to be kept in mind.

Firstly, negotiations need to be open and inclusive. Secondly, it is crucial for all participating countries to act as equals, working for each other’s mutual benefit. It must always be a win-win free trade network. Thirdly, the content of any negotiations must conform to WTO rules, adhering to principles of transparency and non-discrimination. Fourthly, consideration should be given to the use of flexible arrangements which provide developing countries with technological assistance and capacity construction. Fifthly, the participation of member states in global and regional value chains must be encouraged in an environment characterised by freedom, convenience, and competition.

In closing, I will outline a few practical points of focus which should be attended to by Eurasian policymakers.

The connection of hard and soft infrastructure is essential. Software infrastructure harmonisation should optimise market conditions by promoting trade and investment through the elimination of trade barriers. Hardware infrastructure includes network construction and cross-border transport, energy, and information links, ultimately creating a trans-Eurasian logistics and transport system.

The SCO should serve as the platform for promoting Eurasian economic integration. Five members of the Eurasian Economic Union are included among the SCO’s eight member states; together with four observer countries and six dialogue partners, these eighteen countries are the most important countries of the One Belt One Road initiative. As early as in 2002, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s charter clarified its intention to “support and encourage all forms of regional economic cooperation to promote trade and investment liberalisation and realise the free movement of commodities, capital, services and technology”, a goal in alignment with the Greater Eurasia vision, “committed to creating common economic space throughout the entire Eurasian continent”.

It is crucial to be mindful of the diverse levels of economic development seen in China and the five countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. Each partner country should be treated differently under the general objective of trade and investment liberalisation. Consensus should begin at the ‘shallow end’ of trade and investment liberalisation and the simplification of customs regimes. The ‘deep end’ of free movement of capital, services, and technology should follow.

The negotiation of free trade agreements can be completed in stages. The Eurasian Economic Union’s 2015 FTA with Vietnam, its plans for similar agreements with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, and China’s ‘upgraded’ 2010 agreement with ASEAN have laid the foundations for the integration of ASEAN into Eurasia.

Accelerating infrastructure connections at bilateral and multilateral levels is also an important task. For this purpose, the March 2015 document, Vision and actions on jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, outlined six major economic corridors that would traverse the entire Eurasian space. The links between them see ‘Middle Asia’ as a centre for logistics and flows of information, capital, technology, and passengers, easing the region’s dependence on raw material and energy exports and promoting reindustrialisation and modernisation.

Of course, the comprehensive Eurasian partnership cannot fully develop without the participation of the European Union. With this in mind, Eurasian countries must remain willing to establish a free trade area with the EU.


[1] After the Russian revolution in October, a disenfranchised bourgeois group including the White Guards and the White Movement fought back, and Russia entered into civil war. With the defeat of the Novorossiysk А. Dunne Jin Troop, the Crimean П. Fu Lang Troop, and the Far East A. Gal Zak Troop, the white army began to flee, forming three waves of white immigrants. Most of them fled to Europe. After the defeat of the White Army in the Far East, a large number of soldiers and anti-Soviet personnel fled to the Northeast and the Shanghai Concessions of China, known as ‘white Russia’.

[2] Марк Энтин, Екатерина Энтина, В поддержку геополитического проекта Большой Евразии. Electronic publication «Вся Европа»,6(111), 2016.

[3] Дмитрий Тренин, Азиатская политика России: от двустороннуго подхода к глобальной стратегии. Notes de I’Ifri. Russie. Nei. Visions, №94, июнь 2016 г. С.7.

[4] Marlene Laruelle. Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 366.

[5] Дмитрий Тренин, Россия и мир в ХХI веке. Серия русский путь. Москва, Эксмо. 2015. Сc.134, 157.

[6] Дмитрий Тренин, Азиатская политика России: от двустороннуго подхода к глобальной стратегии. NotesdeI’Ifri. Russie. Nei. Visions, №94, июнь 2016 г. С.7.

[7] Cited from Астанинскийклуб, доклад «ГеоэкономикаЕвразии». Ноябрь 2015 года, Астана, Казахстан.C.8.

[8] Cited from Астанинскийклуб, доклад «ГеоэкономикаЕвразии». Ноябрь 2015 года, Астана, Казахстан.C.8.

[9] Тимофей Бордачёв,Создавая Евразию вместе, газета «Известия»,15апреля 2015 года, С.3.

[10] Тимофей Бордачёв,Создавая Евразию вместе, газета «Известия»,15 апреля 2015 года, С.3.

[11] Сергей Караганов, Тимофей Бордачев и др., К Великому океану – 3: Создание Центральной Евразии. Москва, июнь 2015 года. С.13-14.

[12] Сергей Караганов,Поворот к Азии: история политической идеи. Россия в глобальной политике. №6, 2015г.

[13] Юрий Яковец, Еагений Растворцев, Большая Евразия: стратегия партнерства цивилизаций и объединений. Научный доклад. Москва, МИСК, 2017. С.14.

[14] Дмитрий Ефременко, Рождение Большой Евразии. January 31, 2017, Eurasia Research Center Network.

[15] These are: China-Central Asia-West Asia; the new Eurasian Continental Bridge; the Indo-China Peninsula; China-Pakistan; China-Russia-Mongolia; and Bangladesh-China-Indonesia-Myanmar.

[16] These are China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Sea; China-Oceania-South Pacific; and a connection to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.

[17] Xi Jinping remarked on this as part of an address at the 15th session of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

[18] Joint Statement of the People ‘s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, 26 June 2016.

[19] He spoke in Riga as the chairman of the International Affairs Committee at the 20th Baltic Forum: The United States, the EU, and Russia: New Reality.

[20] This is explained by Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.

[21] Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The group was established in 1997, and is seen by some Russian scholars to have anti-Russian tendencies. These are the most pro-Western countries located in the former Soviet Union excluding the Baltic states.

[22] Дмитрий Тренин, Россия и мир в XXI веке. Серия русский путь. Москва, Эксмо. 2015. С.173.

[23] Дмитрий Тренин, Россия и мир в XXI веке. Серия русский путь. Москва, Эксмо. 2015. С.173.

[24] Дмитрий Тренин, Россия и мир в XXI веке. Серия русский путь. Москва, Эксмо. 2015. С.185.

[25] Дмитрий Тренин, Азиатская политика России: от двустороннуго подхода к глобальной стратегии. Notes de I’Ifri. Russie. Nei.Visions, №94, июнь 2016 г. С.3.

[26] Тимофей Бордачёв,Создавая Евразию вместе, газета «Известия»,15 апреля 2015 года, С.3.

[27] Сергей Караганов,Евроазиатский выход из европейского кризиса. Россия в глобальной политпке. №3, 2015

[28] Сергей Караганов,Евроазиатский выход из европейского кризиса. Россия в глобальной политпке. №3, 2015

[29] Астанинскийклуб, доклад «ГеоэкономикаЕвразии». Ноябрь 2015 года, Астана, Казахстан.C.10, 12.

[30] Сергей Караганов, Тимофей Бордачев и др., К Великому океану – 3: Создание Центральной Евразии. Москва, июнь 2015 года. С.14.

[31] Дмитрий Ефременко, Рождение Большой Евразии. January 31, 2017, Eurasia Research Center Network.

[32] Дмитрий Тренин, От Большой Европы к Большой Азии? Китайско-российская Антанта Россия в Глобальной политике. №3, 2015

[33] Сергей Караганов,Поворот к Азии: история политической идеи. Россия в глобальной политике. №6, 2015г.

[34] Сергей Караганов, От поворота на Восток к Большой Евразии: гдлбальный контект. Муждународная жизнь, 5.2017. С.13.

[35] Сергей Караганов, От поворота на Восток к Большой Евразии: гдлбальный контект. Муждународная жизнь, 5.2017. С.13.

[36] Дмитрий Ефременко, Рождение Большой Евразии. January 31, 2017, Eurasia Research Center Network.

[37] Сергей Караганов,Евроазиатский выход из европейского кризиса. Россия в глобальной политпке. №3, 2015

[38] Дмитрий Тренин, От Большой Европы к Большой Азии? Китайско-российская Антанта

Россия в Глобальной политике. №3, 2015

[39] Дмитрий Ефременко, Рождение Большой Евразии. January 31, 2017, Eurasia Research Center Network.

[40] Сергей Караганов, С Востока на Запад, или Большая Евразия. Российская газета – Федеральный выпуск №7109, 24.10.2016 г., с. Влась.

[41] Тимофей Бордачёв,Новое евразийство, Россия в глобальной политике. №2, 2015 г.

[42] Сергей Караганов, Тимофей Бордачев и др., К Великому океану – 3: Создание Центральной Евразии. Москва, июнь 2015 года. С.22.

[43] Астанинскийклуб, доклад «ГеоэкономикаЕвразии». Ноябрь 2015 года, Астана, Казахстан.C.8.

[44] Дмитрий Тренин, От Большой Европы к Большой Азии? Китайско-российская Антанта. Россия в Глобальной политике. №3, 2015

[45] Сергей Караганов, С Востока на Запад, или Большая Евразия. Российская газета – Федеральный выпуск №7109, 24.10.2016 г., с. Влась.

[46] Сергей Караганов, От поворота на Восток к Большой Евразии: гдлбальный контект. Муждународная жизнь, 5.2017. С.18.


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